
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	Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the	
	issues raised in the publication should be directed to	25 <b>X</b> 1

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100	ghan insurgent lead aghly 440 tons of a lley this yearro	nontood supplies in	nto the Danicher	05)//
app	proximately 300 tor	ns of material have	heen moved to	25 <b>X</b> 1
uat	te, but problems will layed the remainder	lth transportation	financing have	25 <b>X</b> 1
	food is re	eadily available in	n the Panjsher.	25X1
0				25X1
sup	plies, combined wi	sed demand for ordr th a shortage of r	nack animals has	
pas	st year,	costs to roughly	double in the	25X1
ord	nance comprised ab	out 80 percent of	Last year the material	20/(1
sub	pped, but the percestantially higher.	entage this year i	s reported to be	25 <b>X</b> 1
IN BRIEF	facility in north on 19 September. were destroyeds were responsible. are increasingly	western Kabul was Fourteen of 17 op uggesting insurgen If so, it means capable of attacki	en storage areas ts or saboteurs the insurgents	<b>25X</b> 1
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PERSPECTIVE	
FGHANISTAN: LIMITS TO US PRESSURE FOR RESISTANCE UNITY	2
	2
A low US profile is essential to the success of efforts to foster resistance unity and generate international support for the Afghan cause. With the proper balance of Pakistani and US guidance and an atmosphere conducive to the alliance reaching its own decisions, the alliance has a fair chance of evolving gradually into a mechanism for better focusing international political attention on the Afghan issue and improving military cooperation among insurgent groups.	
	2
Alliance Tensions and the US Role	
Like the shaky, shifting alliances that preceded it, the Ittihad Islami suffers from ethnic, tribal, and religious differences and the conflicting ambitions of several leaders. Although alliance members welcome US aid, the nature of the US political role is a source of friction.	;
Alliance groups led by Gailani, Mojadedi, and Nabi which are linked with the former Afghan ruling classes and the Westfavor a stronger US political role. The fundamentalistsled by Gulbuddin, Khalis, Rabbani, and Sayyafwho desire an Islamic republic in Afghanistan, tend to be anti-Western as well as anti-Communist. They are the strongest forces in the resistance. Some fundamentalists are probably in accord with the views of Gulbuddin, who has publicly stated his belief that the United States is involved in aiding the resistance primarily to gain influence and prevent establishment of an Iranian-style republic in Afghanistan.	25
Another influential fundamentalist leader, Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf, also often takes a publicly anti-Western stance. If Islamic fundamentalists come to agree that the alliance is a US	,
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tool, Sayyaf, Gulbuddin, and perhaps others are likely to opt out. Even more moderate Peshawar exile leaders would see strong US involvement as undercutting their efforts to rebut charges that they are pawns of the United States.	25
US leverage can best be exerted through third parties. Pressure from Pakistan is acceptable to the insurgents generally, and many US objectives probably can be best effected through Pakistan. In order to foster the legitimacy of the alliance, the United States probably will have to avoid direct involvement in the alliance's decision-making process and in other	
resistance activities likely to draw media attention. Because anti-US rhetoric from resistance leaders like Gulbuddin provides the alliance with an aura of independence, it might be wise for the United States to promote such criticism occasionally and quietly.	25X

## Pakistani Concerns

President Zia welcomes insurgent pressure on the Soviets and wishes to maintain a good relationship with the United States, but Islamabad has its own fears about a too visible US role. The US Embassy in Islamabad recently noted indications of Pakistani unhappiness about US contacts with resistance leaders and the US effort to have a resistance delegation attend this fall's UNGA session.

- -- Islamabad fears that widespread perception of the Afghan struggle as an East-West issue would link Pakistan too openly with the West and lead to increased Soviet military and political pressure.
- -- Islamabad does not want to see an insurgent alliance become too potent a military and political force because it fears such a force might be subject to manipulation by Pakistani opposition parties and factions.
- -- Islamabad also is concerned that the Saudis may seek to dominate the resistance council. strong Saudi hand in the fundamentalist alliance during 1983 and 1984 intensified rivalries among resistance groups.

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Pakistan man haliana da d	
Pakistan may believe that an increased role by the United States or Saudi Arabia in the new alliance would lead the Iranians to introduce	
complications for the insurgency. Iranian officials at various times have hampered	
operations and resupply for some Sunni insurgent groups because they had Saudi backing.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The UN Angle	
Outside pressurebest applied by Pakistanwould be essential to ensure the selection of a capable, unified	
delegation to advance alliance interests. A fractious delegation would discredit the resistance A	
delegation closely linked with the United States would alienate some Third World countries, such as Iran, and we believe the annual resolution calling for the	
withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan would lose support.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Use of intermediaries to persuade Iran or Turkey to help an Afghan resistance delegation establish	
political and media contacts would provide proper distance from the United States.	25 <b>X</b> 1

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